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Understanding the Appeal of ISIS
Lydia Wilson
University of Oxford

The Islamic State, or ISIS, has proven to be persistently successful in attracting people from
all over the globe to join in its state-building and state-defending enterprise. This article
explores the messages it has crafted, from the utopian to the militarily defensive, and the
techniques it uses to propagate these messages (including on social media), which includes
some historical comparisons to communism and Nazism. It goes on to provide initial research
findings from the field to show how their message is working among (a small percentage of)
the target audience, sketching the theory of identity fusion to argue that it is a sense of
belonging to one group above all others that persuades people to travel to another country to
kill and die for a cause.
___________________________________________________________________________

There is no single path to ISIS, just as there is no single path to any form of extremism.1 But
there are similarities among cases of people joining ISIS across the world, in almost a hundred
countries from Australia to the United States. This article presents an overview of overarching
themes from the Islamic State propaganda and from the broad similarities before dissecting
how common they are. It goes on to look at local factors that contribute to the flow of fighters
to the Islamic State, a movement that is seemingly unprecedented in the stretch and reach of
its appeal.
A note on the name: before the declaration of the caliphate in June 2014, the group called
itself ad-Dawlat al-Islamiyya fi-l ‘Iraq wa ash-Sham, literally the Islamic State in Iraq and ashSham. Ash-Sham is an inexact word in English. It can be used for Damascus alone, but in this
instance it refers to Belad ash-Sham, “the country of Ash-Sham,” the so-called Greater Syria,
a historic area taking in modern-day Syria, Lebanon, and parts of south Turkey, Jordan, and
Israel–Palestine—which could be translated as the Levant. Some commentators quickly named
the group ISIS by translating ash-Sham as Syria, partly because that is where the group was
established—modern-day Syria as well as Iraq—exploiting the chaos of the Syrian conflict.
Others, including al-Jazeera and President Barack Obama, chose ISIL, translating ash-Sham as
the Levant, a more accurate translation. With the declaration of the caliphate, the group
changed its name to simply Dawlat al-Islamiyya, the Islamic State, disdaining the “colonialist”
borders, and released a video showing a symbolic bulldozing of the so-called Sykes-Picot
borders, which refers to the agreement between France and Britain that defined the countries a
hundred years before. 2 They announced they were henceforth to be the Islamic State, not
confined to any particular “colonialist” country, thus signaling their global ambitions. Their
Arab enemies use the acronym of their first name: Da’ish, the exact equivalent of ISIS or ISIL,
depending on how you translate ash-Sham. This label infuriates ISIS not just because it
removes their legitimacy as the sole Islamic state in the world but because the acronym sounds
like da’es (just one letter different, with an Arabic s rather than the single Arabic letter sh),
which means to stamp or trample. It makes them so angry that they punish people they hear
using it; reports have suggested that the punishments include cutting out tongues and flogging.3

Lydia Wilson is a research fellow at the Centre for the Resolution of Intractable Conflict, Harris Manchester
College, University of Oxford, researching motivations for and pathways to violence through extensive fieldwork.
She is currently writing a book on the ISIS.
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The name used here is ISIS for no better reason than it is the name used by the majority of
commentators and experts.

ISIS Propaganda: The Techniques
Messages from ISIS come in many forms, cleverly targeted to many audiences, including their
enemies. These include video games that mimic already popular products, such as Call of Duty,
which, reinterpreted as Call of Jihad, copies much of the style and design of the original (see
Figure 1). Grand Theft Auto retains the name but with the added subtitle Saleel as-Sawarim,
or Clash of Swords (see Figure 2). (This name is used for many other products, from historical
television series to the nasheeds, or chants, of the Islamic State.) The backdrops were changed
to reflect the scenery of the battles in Northern Syria and Iraq; the enemies wear US military
uniforms. The target audience is clear: young men, the overwhelming demographic who play
Grand Theft Auto, as illustrated by a British jihadi interviewed by the BBC after he traveled to
Syria to fight who said that life with ISIS is “better than that game Call of Duty.” 4 An Islamic
State official was quoted as saying that the game’s goal is to “raise the morale of the mujahedin
and to train children and youth how to battle the West and to strike terror into the hearts of
those who oppose the Islamic State.”5

Figure 1. Call of Jihad co-opted the Call of Duty branding entirely

Figure 2. Grand Theft Auto, with the ISIS flag and “Saleel as-Sawarim” in Arabic
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The three main production companies in the Islamic State (and the twenty-six others in
regions outside their current borders in Syria and Iraq) are staffed by experienced filmmakers
and technicians who are given further, intensive training before starting work.6 Using advanced
computer-design techniques, they have produced a continual stream of videos throughout the
period of ISIS statehood that includes brutal videos of executions made to inspire terror in their
enemies.7 They have also produced rougher products along the lines of home videos, or citizen
journalism, to appeal to different audiences. In addition to the video games, other ISIS products
mimic Western imagery: Javier Lesaca has analyzed 845 videos and identified images and
scenes from Saw, The Matrix, American Sniper, and V for Vendetta, among others.8
Online magazines in many languages (for example, Dabiq is in English, Dar al-Islam in
French) regularly transmit military news and reports of terrorist attacks around the world. Their
issues also include essays on ideology, descriptions of normal life, and even advertisements for
jobs in the Islamic State. The essays are long and intricate and very repetitive from issue to
issue. They are designed as positioning statements rather than propaganda, material to study
and refer to if you are interested in the ideological framework of ISIS. Far more effective for
recruitment, however, are the personal videos and photos from the frontline or from daily life
that ISIS’s extensive network of supporters post on social media.
Twitter has been a useful medium for spreading the ISIS message, especially during the
crucial early days of the Islamic State’s declaration of a caliphate, in June 2014. 9 ISIS
successfully seized on the methodology of “hashtag hijacking,” adding to their tweets the
hashtag of whatever was trending at that moment. Figure 3 shows a tweet from an ISIS account
that includes #JustinBieber. Though very few of those who click further will be sympathetic to
the movement, to ISIS, with formidable manpower at their disposal, the ability to draw in the
tiny fraction of 1 percent who are already susceptible is worth the effort. Twitter’s recent
shutting down of these accounts has been remarkably successful in limiting the reach of ISIS
on their platform, though this action could not completely silence extremist voices.10

Figure 3. Hashtag hijacking: this tweet from ISIS randomly includes
#JustinBieber to capture Justin Bieber fans

ISIS used Twitter in combination with other platforms. For example, the website
Justpaste.it allowed ISIS to enter any material—text, photos, video—and then generated a
small URL that did not reflect the content. (See Figure 4 for an example from the ISIS media
production company Al-Furqan.) Thus, ISIS was able to bypass problems with bots that
automatically spot extremist content; in order for Twitter to remove it, other users had to report
the content. The site is minimal, meaning minimal bandwidth is needed to load content, an
important consideration in a war zone or where services are intermittent.
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Figure 4. Example of a Justpaste.it page from Al-Furqan, a production
company in the Islamic State

ISIS even created their own app for android phones, the Dawn of Glad Tidings (see Figure
5). When downloading the app, users sign away their privacy rights, giving ISIS access to their
contacts and, crucially, their twitter account. J. M. Berger describes what happens next:
Once you sign up, the app will post tweets to your account—the content of
which is decided by someone in ISIS’s social-media operation. The tweets
include links, hashtags, and images, and the same content is also tweeted by the
accounts of everyone else who has signed up for the app, spaced out to avoid
triggering Twitter’s spam-detection algorithms. Your Twitter account functions
normally the rest of the time, allowing you to go about your business.11

Figure 5. The ISIS app Dawn of Good Tidings, as it appeared on the
app store

The fraction of people who respond to these overt forms of propaganda are contacted, and
the conversation, for a fraction of that fraction, is quickly shifted to private messaging
platforms, such as the ubiquitous Skype and WhatsApp or the more encrypted Telegram, Kik,
Wickr, Threema, and others. ISIS also hires recruiters who respond to people’s expressions of
anger at their government, alienation from their society, longing for purer Islamic governance,
and so on, both on and offline, and reach out one-to-one. In these more private conversations
the messages are driven home, but what is more important is that these private conversations
4
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engage the individuals as individuals, because their interlocutors listen and respond to their
personal concerns and the details of their lives, making them feel valued and cared for and
creating a sense of warmth, inclusion, and belonging. First, however, the actual message, rather
than the media, must be explored to understand the context of this pull of belonging.

The Perfect State of ISIS and Others
Western media have done a good job of publicizing the brutal side of ISIS: the videos, photos,
and statements that ISIS has issued showing beheadings of westerners, the mass executions of
Shia soldiers, and the statements of threats to any kuffars, or unbelievers, in any country can
be found on media websites the world over. This dissemination has spread fear of the group in
the West, one of ISIS’s aims,12 but it has also obscured to a Western audience the revolutionary
message of idealism and joy that attracts many young people to the cause, which in turn blocks
our understanding of and our ability to combat the appeal.
It all adds up, however, to a rather simple message: for the first time in a hundred years
there is a caliphate, an Islamic state; but unlike that of the Ottomans, it is truly following God’s
law, strictly, with no corruption. This difference makes the caliphate a utopia on earth, and for
some people, this utopia will usher in the apocalypse following the defeat of the kuffar armies
inevitably ranged against it,13 and it is every Muslim’s duty to travel there (in jihadi terms:
make hejira, echoing the hejira of the Prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina that marks
the beginning of the Islamic calendar) and help build this fledgling state.14
Al-Hayat, a well-branded production company in the Islamic State, has, so far, produced
eight short films called mujatweets, a play on mujahidin (people who perform jihad) and
“tweet” to show they are short.15 They are designed to show the utopia the Islamic State offers
and are available in many languages. They include all generations (boys and girls and men of
all ages but no women) and a range of races (one mujatweet features only happy blond Bosnian
children), they stress the camaraderie and joy of living in a utopia, and they show a land of
plenty, where the markets are full of fresh produce and the meals are generous, and where
children in the park are handed candy floss and chocolate by smiling fighters. There is even a
mujatweet profiling a shawarma seller. The fight, however, is never sidelined: guns are
omnipresent, with most featured men clearly fighters, even when children are profiled. (See
Figure 6 for a still from mujatweet 8.) There is no mistaking the message that the next
generation of the Islamic State is made up of diverse, happy, committed, and militant citizens.

Figure 6. A still from mujatweet 8.
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This narrative not only attracts idealistic young Muslims but it helps encourage people
already in the Islamic State who are discouraged by the hardships they encounter: the lack of
electricity, Western luxuries, and sometimes food and basic medical supplies and, in some
areas, the constant bombardment. Of course it is hard, the narrative tells them, because this is
the beginning; everything new must be built with sacrifice and effort. The brutality of the ISIS
interpretation of sharia, when witnessed in person, can be a shock, but this too can be overcome,
ISIS argues, using the narrative of a new state: once people are used to the law, there will be
less crime and thus, inevitably, less need to punish people. In other words, these are just
birthing pains.
Use of the utopian ideal as a motivator to fight and struggle has many precedents. The
most obvious parallel in the twentieth century is communism, which called on people to make
huge sacrifices to support what they believed was a socially just system on earth, as represented
in George Orwell’s 1984 by the character Boxer, a strong but easily persuaded workhorse who
regularly tells himself, “I will work harder” to overcome any problems that the new system
produces. Also, the global reach of the Islamic State is reflected in the numbers of people who
went to Spain from the United States and other parts of Europe to fight for communism during
the Spanish Civil War and in the numbers who, like double agent Kim Philby, spied on their
countries for the Soviet Union. And there are more recent examples: the last time I visited the
Marxist-Leninist–based Kurdish separatist organization the PKK (the Kurdish Workers’
Party), I interviewed a young German who had left his hometown at age twenty to fight with
them. Because the majority of the PKK fighters I have interviewed over the past five years
have been fearsome Kurdish Nationalists, I asked about his motivations as a white German.
His answer, in response to various probes, had to do with socialism: the PKK, he said, is the
purest form of the ideology in the world today, and with a victory in Kurdistan, the world could,
and probably would, follow their example. Thus, he believes that he has committed to a new
embodiment of the socialist revolution still in its embryonic form, as many of those traveling
to Syria in the past two years also believe. This belief requires and enables huge sacrifices; the
movement’s embryonic state can excuse certain mistakes by the leadership, and it gives one a
sense of adventure, glory, and duty—a heady blend, especially for a young person who wishes
to change the world.
A comparison can also be made with the Hitler Youth movement, which captured large
numbers of German youth in pursuit of a better world. It was based on an ideology of racial
purity that invoked nostalgic images of the German Volk to build an idealized version of what
the German race was when it was strong, and what therefore should be recreated. This method
of reading history to build a vision for the future strong enough to motivate people to fight and
die is seen in the propaganda of ISIS, which uses the Qur’an and the hadith, the sayings and
doings of the Prophet, to define and illustrate the ideology. In the Prophet’s time, when Islam
was pure, the religion spread easily, and Islamic rule covered much of the world. But, the
argument goes, to explain the state of the Middle East today, when impurities were brought in
from non-Muslim sources, such as Europe and later the United States, and weak leaders
adopted political systems, such as democracy or socialism, Islam was weakened and the
Islamic world made vulnerable. If the Islamic society and rule of the Prophet’s teachings could
be brought back, Islam, the Islamic community or Ummah, and the Islamic world will once
again flourish.16
These comparisons illuminate a basic point: this is not all about the ideology of Islam,
because vastly different ideological frameworks (socio-economic-political, racial, religious
represented by communism, national socialism, and Islamism, respectively) can inspire
identical actions for identical end goals. What is more important is that these ideological
frameworks structure a group, and interviews with many fighters from different extremist
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groups have pointed to a far stronger factor in the pull to join such groups and make the most
extreme sacrifices on their behalf: the human desire to belong.

Pull and Push Factors: Identity and Belonging
One of the striking aspects of much of the Islamic State’s utopian propaganda, including the
mujatweets and the more effective material shot by fighters while at the front or in their time
off, is the camaraderie among soldiers and civilians alike. This age-old reported feature of
fighters, of being bonded by the constant threat of death, has been quantified and tested in terms
of identity, and it is currently being tested with ISIS fighters all over the world.17
In 2012, William B. Swann and colleagues published a landmark paper in which, drawing
on previous work in psychology and sociology to do with community and social identification,
they identify a mechanism they call “identity fusion.” They define it as a “form of alignment
with groups that entails a visceral feeling of oneness with the group,” adding, “this feeling is
associated with unusually porous, highly permeable borders between the personal and social
self.”18
At the point of “visceral oneness with the group,” an insult, a compliment, or an injury to
the group or to another member of the group is perceived as an insult, a compliment, or an
injury to the self, prompting all the same responses up to and including fighting and dying.
When one identity clearly dominates another, for example, when someone feels a visceral
oneness with the entire Islamic community, over and above his or her own biological family,
that person can sacrifice all—including the family—for that one element of identity.
The Islamic State knows this effect all too well and exploits the extremist position of “them
and us,” of “You’re with us or you’re against us.” President George W. Bush’s statement of
this position after 9/11 (to which he added, “There is no in between”)19 was gleefully seized
on by Osama bin Laden and has been used by various factions, in Islamist and Western circles,
ever since.20 ISIS states their position very clearly in their English-language online magazine,
Dabiq, in an essay titled “The Extinction of the Grayzone.”21 They argue that if you have any
true Islamic faith, it is hypocrisy to remain in a non-Islamic country (that is, all the countries
currently seen as part of the Islamic world, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Morocco, whose
leaders are labeled as non-Islamic rulers by virtue of their failure to apply the Prophet’s law)
when there is an alternative—the Islamic State run on the Islamic law of the Prophet’s time.
This argument runs the risk of alienating some but has the advantage of propelling others into
a single identity and away from their national, tribal, ethnic, and other identities.
Much of the public propaganda and the private messaging is tailored to local contexts.
Most obvious is the use of a huge number of languages from Chinese to Russian to Indonesian
to English, and, crucially for this process of creating a strong group identity, the use of local
grievances to fuel alienation from competing identities, such as nationalism. Detailed criticisms
of the failures of liberal democracies and free-market capitalism often zone in on national
examples, such as budgets that promote inequality. Members of the Saudi royal family are cited
for their hypocrisy in preaching piety while practicing hedonism, and the leaders of Morocco
and Jordan are criticized for attempting the impossible, combining democratic ideals with
Islam. On a more personal level, efforts to alienate Muslims from their French, American, and
British identities draw on the Islamophobia of the West, as revealed in the pronouncements of
politicians (Donald Trump on the campaign trail was a gift to their message) and in such social
realities as the casual racism seen in hate speech and hate crimes, which have become a constant
source of messages from ISIS. Banning the burkini is an example of the political and the social:
the ruling and the popular response could both be cast as a rejection of Muslims in France (and
the photo of armed police ordering a burkini-clad woman to strip that went viral was another
gift). In other, less obviously ideologically structured appeals to these alienated people,
7
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frustrated ambitions in education, economic situation, and social situation are cast as the effects
of governments not caring. Individuals at a crossroads, whether personal, such as after a death
or the break-up of a relationship, or professional, such as after the loss of a job, are reached out
to if they express bitterness toward their wider society, for example, on Facebook.
To a large extent the Islamic State’s propaganda and techniques exploit the all-consuming
need to belong and to feel welcome. The other side of the coin is the contextual push factor:
we welcome you in a world that continually rejects your identity as Muslim.

Belonging vs. Ideology
Obama’s statement in 2014 that the Islamic State is “not Islamic” provoked a huge backlash
with the perception that he was protecting Islam when they themselves were claiming that their
brutality was within the holy texts of Islam.22 The question is, Who gets to speak for Islam, or
even more, to define Islam? Is it Obama, a non-Muslim, or the caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
who claims descent from the Prophet’s own tribe? Is it an imam in New York or an imam in
Iraq? As with any global religion, the interpretations are too numerous to count, and there can
be no one authority on the issue, no matter how famous he is or what title he holds. To claim
that ISIS is not Islamic in the light of all their pronouncements to the contrary is to obscure the
public debate and generate conspiracy theories that Obama is in fact protecting Muslims.
The group duality that ISIS promotes (us vs. them, with a definition of Islam so extreme
that “them” includes the majority of Muslims in the world as well as all the non-Muslims) is
common to many extremist groups, such as cults and far-right nationalist groups, and is often
accompanied by a similar binary attitude in the personal worldviews of extremist individuals,
a long-studied feature in the psychology of fundamentalism.23 In these binary worldviews there
is always one correct thing to do in any situation, a rule for every occasion. (This attitude is
also expressed in ISIS’s essay “The Extinction of the Grayzone,” which states that “the Qur’ān,
the divider between truth and falsehood” is the arbiter of all behavior.)24 It might seem that
binary attitudes toward the personal and the group go together but they do not: an individual
can be committed to an exclusionist identity yet see gray areas in personal areas of life—though
this generosity is more often extended to the ingroup than the outgroup.
Binary ideology, however, can and does structure individual behavior, and the instructions
from ISIS, backed up by (carefully curated) scripture from the Qur’an and the hadith, gives a
comforting certainty to life under the strict and detailed sharia law ISIS has developed—if
certainty is what one is after. What comes first and which plays a greater role, the sense of
belonging or the framing ideology, is a thorny question in scholarship, but by using fusion
theory in interviews with fighters all over the world, researchers are finding that the fusion to
the group motivates extreme action, framed by the ideology that defines the group.
Let us then conclude that ideology does play a part in attracting someone to fight in a
foreign country, or to commit other extreme actions, and that the repetition of certain Qur’anic
verses and other quotations from the traditions of the Prophet, or hadith, reveals a strongly
articulated and strongly supported Islamic framework for the arguments of the Islamic State.
But it cannot be as simple as creating a coherent and extreme ideology and waiting for people
to flock to you. People are not so easily persuaded, and there are too many groups and causes
competing for their attention and commitment. Our initial research into the motivations of those
who have traveled to and fought for the Islamic State show they are not so interested in the
ideology—for a start, many expressed confusion over the concepts of caliphate, jihad, and
sharia—but were attracted to the sense of brotherhood. One major reason defectors give for
leaving the Islamic State is disillusionment over finding the same racism, inequality, and
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corruption that exists in their own countries, and perhaps even worse. Rather than ideology per
se, what may pull someone back from traveling to join ISIS is the group that the ideology
defines and, more important, how that group defines the outgroups, some of which are the
competing identities, such as nationality, family, and ethnicity.
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